The differences between Sluicing and namely are thus problematic for an analysis where (2b) is Bill coughed and ellipsis is licensed under some sort of identity/convergence with the implicit question who coughed. Before fleshing out our proposal, note one further striking fact: namely is not always supported by embedded wh-questions (this poses a serious challenge to pure formal identity, and also to the account in Jacobson 2010): (7) a. John figured out who I plan to give the prize to, namely Sally.
b. *John hasn't figured out who I plan to give the prize to, namely Sally. Rather than a requirement for identical clausal material, the generalization is that namely is licensed only by preceding elements which support a discourse referent. Namely X then answers a question to further identity/specify this referent. (2b) answers (roughly) the question What is the identity of the one who coughed?. Of course, this is similar to Who coughed? -an answer to one will often be an answer to the other, but the ordinary wh-question crucially diverges from the specificational one in cases like (3), as we have seen. Note too that not only does namely answer only a specificational question, but in fact the question must be implicit too (cf. (8) Our proposal is in line with insights in previous literature to the effect namely is 'specificational' (e.g., Onea 2015 , Condoravdi 2015 . But it leads us to conclude that there is no obvious semantically appropriate clausal source (with some sort of identity to an antecedent) for the complement of namely. Note that the contrast in (7) follows from this analysis: (7a) but not (7b) introduces a discourse referent, as verified by the possibility of subsequent anaphora in (9): (9) a. John figured out who I plan to give the prize to. She deserves it. b. John hasn't figured out who I plan to give the prize to. ?*She deserves it. The contrast between (5a) and (5b) with namely also follows (but for a different reason as the Sluicing contrasts). It is well known that indefinites introduce discourse referents that can be referred to with a pronoun. But (5b) is a classic 'marbles' case (Partee, cited in Heim, 1982) , and so cannot be followed by She did so easily. Moreover, implicit arguments don't introduce discourse referents; namely fails in (9a) for the same reason that anaphora is impossible: (10) Sally was murdered. (a) *Namely, by Jack. (b) *He had used a knife. Note an apparent challenge to the claim that namely cannot 'sprout' an implicit argument: (11) Fido has a very silly fear, namely of the left side of the bridge. But the complement of namely need not be analyzed as a sprouted argument; it further specifies/identifies the fear, exactly as in an overt specificational case like (12) (Higgins, 1973) : (12) His fear is of the left side of the bridge.
One final attempt to save a clausal analysis of how the namely complement makes its contribution is to posit that these involve ellipsis from specificational 'short clefts' or identity statement (in (2b): namely, it is Bill). But we show that this has no advantage over a Qu-Ans approach and still leaves unexplained the fact that ellipsis is obligatory: (13) Someone coughed. *Namely, it was Bill.
Rather than ellipsis, we show that an extension of the Qu-Ans analysis is straightforward. The complement of namely is not a hidden proposition. But the semantics of namely is a direction to combine the meaning of its complement with a function into propositions (as in the Qu-Ans analysis) derived from the relevant question about identity. (See Groenendijk and Stokhof (1989) on the relationship between a question as a set of propositions and the function needed in the Qu-Ans analysis; their observations about main clause questions extend readily to
